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In The Biology of Homosexuality Jacques Balthazart makes a detached scientific argument 
that biology can explain why some people are gay and others are not.  Among books that 
make this argument, Balthazart’s is distinct for its focus on laboratory studies of animal 
sexuality.  Brace yourself for descriptions of studies that analogize your most intimate 
moments with your partner to the choices made by caged rats and mice in the laboratory (and 
the occasional reference to a sheep or a quail). This emphasis on animals, which reflects the 
author’s research interests, has influenced his detailed descriptions of the experimental 
paradigms used to examine hormonal influences on sexual behaviour.  In the latter part of the 
book, the author turns his attention to humans, and specifically reviews studies of intersex 
people and anatomical correlates of sexual orientation.  In both sections he argues with 
detachment for a “unity of life” thesis that studies of animal sexuality provide a plausible 
analogy of human sexuality.  
 
Balthazart also makes a moral point.  He not only argues that biology makes some humans 
gay or straight (with other options rarely mentioned), he assumes throughout that biological 
models can make society gay-friendly. He expresses a hope up front that if people accept his 
argument that “sexual orientation is probably under the control of embryonic 
endocrine/genetic phenomena in which there is little room for individual choice”, then 
society will then “rethink its attitudes toward homosexuals and their parents” (p. x). 
Balthazart’s intention seems to be to shift thinking about homosexuality away from the moral 
domain of personal choice toward the less morally worrisome ground of biology.  This goal is 
laudable even if it is no longer particularly novel or exceptional for scientists to oppose 
homophobia in print.  However, reading Balthazar’s review of the biological evidence led me 
to conclude that biological science is anything but free of the moral obligations that come 
with choice.  Let me clarify what I mean with examples.   
 First, Balthazart asserts the widely shared value that ideology should have no place in 
science, and that scientists should not confuse their political stance with the scientific 
evidence.  More than once, he identifies the biologist Christine Vidal as making this error, 
and Vidal has publicly argued against Balthazart’s position that gender differences in 
behaviour result from early hormonal organization of the brain.  In contrast, Balthazart 
uncritically cites the work of scientists who have argued for explicitly homophobic uses of 
science about homosexuality, such as Paul Cameron and Günter Dörner. The choice of target 
for this critique is telling.  It suggests that the reader should worry more about ideological 
bias that impacts the hypothesis that our brains determine our genders than ideological bias 
that uses science to promote homophobic positions.  Balthazar’s opposition to ideologically 
driven science is unremarkable, but his choice of targets is questionable.   
 
Balthazart also expresses the very reasonable view that scientists should not harm other 
humans to pursue their research ends.  He repeats at length the account of John Money’s 
studies of David Riemer, whose penis was accidentally mutilated in infancy and who was 
later raised as a girl.   Money used this case to promote a view that gender roles were entirely 
encoded through socialization, and Balthazart is right to critique not only Money’s mis-
representation of Riemer’s life, but also the abuse that Riemer suffered as a child in Money’s 
research study. No equivalent concern is expressed for the harm that is done to women born 
with congenital adrenal hyperplasia or to mothers who were treated with diethylstilbestrol 
during pregnancy.  Both groups have been subject to genital surgery in infancy that has had 
long-standing effects on sexual functioning (Minto et al., 2003).  Balthazart simply positions 
clinical accounts of such women as useful data for resolving nature/nurture debates (largely 
in favour of his hormonal hypothesis).  On balance he seems far more concerned to flag the 
harm done to children who are subjects in research supporting nurture arguments than nature 
arguments.  Again, this choice of target for critique is not fully explained or justified. 
 
While much of this book is about animals, it is, of course, moral arguments about human 
homosexuals that concern us the most.  Scientists express values when they select theories, 
and they must often chose between theories that are simpler and more parsimonious, and 
theories that can explain a wider range of phenomena. Balthazart relies on the value of 
parsimony to argue for the “unity of life” thesis that animal studies provide a model for 
humans, such that “differences between species lie in the details” (p. 43).  However, it was 
the evidence against this thesis that best communicated the author’s fascination with animals. 
Balthazart describes differences in the hormonal organization of sexuality between rats and 
mice, notes that rodent species differ radically from humans because rodents do not pair-
bond, that rodents differ from rams that spontaneously have sex with each other outside the 
laboratory, and that animal sex differs from human sex because the former involves only 
fixed motor action patterns.  These differences piqued my scientific curiosity about 
variability among animals but reduced my confidence in the author’s unity of life hypothesis 
in sexuality research. One ethical implication of the unity of life argument is that animals that 
are like humans should be treated humanely.  Balthazart chose to ignore this possibility 
throughout this book. 
 
It is a core scientific value that theory must be accountable to evidence, but the value of 
parsimony sometimes leads authors to sacrifice accuracy for simplicity. In these situations, 
the choice of which data to focus on or to overlook communicates the scientist’s values about 
the people and animals represented by the data.  Overall, data on women and on female 
animals are overlooked, whilst data on men and male animals in this area of research are 
made central to Balthazart’s argument about endocrinology  The author seems unaware of 
findings about sexual fluidity among women (Diamond, 2008), and tends to assume that a 
dimorphic model of sexual orientation adequately explains all human sexual behavior.  
Whilst he argues that it is an ideological bias to assert that sexuality is now tied to 
reproduction for humans, he also neglects the hormonal correlates of childbirth, insisting that 
oxytocin is irrelevant for understanding human sexual behaviour.   
 
Finally, one’s values can be expressed through choices of language.  Some of Balthazart’s 
analogies between humans and animals are jarring (e.g,. “Estradiol controls the development 
of the oviduct in the chicken, as well as in the rat and woman” [p. 31]).  Balthazart repeatedly 
misgenders transgender and intersex people by referring to them with a sex category to which 
they do not identify (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2012).  His understanding of transsexuality as a 
case “when the sexual identity is at odds with the physical sex” (p. 3) is also somewhat odd.  
 
At the end of the book, Balthazart briefly re-examines the idea that biology makes one gay-
friendly.  Here too he notes exceptions, arguing that in “ethically deviant societies” 
homophobia has multiple roots that are unrelated to thinking about biology. He also notes 
that a minority of gay people would disagree with his thesis and assert that they had some 
choice in their sexual orientation.  I left this book more intrigued by animal sexuality, but 
unconvinced that biological models escaped matters of politics, ethics, or value.  I welcome 
all attempts to undo homophobia, but the author’s decisions to target women scientists, 
overlook harm caused to intersex women, misrepresent transsexual people, neglect women’s 
sexuality, and describe some societies as “ethically deviant” were all choices that had no 
empirical basis and which contributed far more to the author’s conclusion than he 
acknowledged or discussed.   
 Finally, my enthusiasm for this use of biology to counter homophobia is tempered by the 
evidence of social psychology.  Biological models support the biological basis of 
homosexuality, but they also imply that gay and straight people are fundamentally different, 
and this latter belief is associated with prejudice (Haslam & Levy, 2006).  Balthazart’s book 
constructs a very fixed category boundary between homosexuality and heterosexuality that is 
the consistent across humans, rats,sheep and quail.  The emphasis on this boundary may 
promote belief systems that engender homophobia as well as those that seem to delegitimize 
it.  In spite of the clarity of its presentation, I am not sure that this account of biology will 
make society more tolerant of gay people. Instead, I left this book wondering if the 
increasingly common wish that homophobia would end might have played a part in making 
this genre of biological science more tolerable to many people. 
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